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In this paper we try to construct an hypothesis as to why, as
data seem to show, countries that adopt more “transparent
procurement”, as calculated by the share of tender advertised
publicly, are also the ones where corruption is considered more
pervasive. We describe an economy where in equilibrium countries
more prone to corruption find it optimal to increase transparency
more to curb corruption itself. However, as transparency is costly
to implement, this will not be enough to bring corruption levels to
those of inherently less corrupt societies. We finally suggest
alternative ways to reduce corruption in procurement. [JEL
Classification: H57]
1. - Introduction
The greater part of modern States uses public procurement
in order to obtain the goods and services that it deems are
necessary to support its publicy policy actions. But this
procurement is not immune to manipulations through collusion
and corruption. As Rose-Ackerman (1999) said:
Corruption occurs at the interface of the public and private
sectors. Whenever a public official has discretionary power over
distribution to the private sector of a benefit or cost, incentives
for bribery are created.(...) When the government is a buyer or a
contractor, there are several reasons to pay off officials. First, a
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firm may pay to be included in the list of qualified bidders.
Second, it may pay to have officials structure bidding
specifications so that the corrupt firm is the only qualified
supplier. Third, once a firm has been selected, it may pay to get
inflated prices or to skimp on quality. 
Corruption means that the person who runs the auction, the
auctioneer, twists the auction rules in favor of a bidder in
exchange for a bribe. The World Bank estimated the volume of
bribes exchanging hands for public sector procurement alone to
roughly 200 billion dollars per year (see Kaufman, 2004). The
problem, while more acute in developing countries, is by no means
irrelevant for more economically advanced ones: Kaufman (2003)
reports that “favouritism in procurement award” remains the
number one problem for OECD firms once compared with other
sources of bad public governance (illegal political financing, legal
political financing influencing politics, firm’s capture of laws and
regulations, ineffective Parliament). In general, corruption is a
problem if the auctioneer is an agent of the seller, as is the case
if the seller is a government. 
There are different kinds of corruption in procurement.
Lengwiler and Wolfstetter (2006) survey most of them, their
implications for efficiency and redistribution and the possible
solutions to avoid it.1 They point out, among other things, the
central feature that plays, for corrupted outcomes, the use of
discretion in evaluating tenders based on the MEAT (most
economically advantageous offer) criterion. Rankings by quality
are now fully accepted in the new EU directive, to gain flexibility
and accuracy in awards, at the obvious expense of some added
concern in terms of corruption possibilities. Distortion of quality
rankings indeed remains a serious possibility that takes advantage
of the sometimes poor monitoring capacity of external agents
when analyzing the features of contract performance, mostly
because of asymmetric information. 
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1 Interestingly, they view the shift to e-procurement, with its added layers of
security, as a strategic tool to reduce the effectiveness of some ways in which
corrupt procurement has traditionally taken place.
Transparency is often suggested as a tool to reduce the
potential for corruption. In the European Directive, transparency
is considered, together with competition, as a “principle”. This
creates in the mind of many economists a certain degree of
confusion in that some kinds of transparency foster instead more
collusion (e.g. in the case of reverse on-line auctions in a collusive
environment, greater visibility of rivals’ offers increases the
possibility of sanctioning any cartel defector) or are necessarily
costly (for example the unit costs of an open procedure are larger
the smaller the amount procured given the fixed nature of some
of these, like publication costs and tender committee costs). 
Nevertheless it is clear that publishing a tender improves the
knowledge of the needs of the purchaser, fosters participation and
raises accountability for the procurer, making corruption a more
difficult and therefore less likely outcome.
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Legend: CPI (Corruption Perception Index) is an index that defines corruption
as the abuse of public office for private gain, and measures the degree to which
corruption is perceived to exist among a country’s public officials and politicians.
The scores range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). Transparency
is measured by the share of total public procurement published in the Official
Journal, source: EC, DG Market.
A look at the data seems however to say otherwise. If we
rank countries by their inclination to corruption (Corruption
Perception Index, CPI) as stated for example by Transparency
International2 we find that the least corrupt countries choose a
less transparent way of handling their tenders (lower share of
total public procurement published in the Official Journal,
source: EC, DG Market) while countries reputed for their higher
degree of corrupt behaviour appear more transparent in their
procurement.
A more serious empirical analysis would be needed to study
the statistical significance and the causality of this result. Here
however we concentrate on understanding better the theoretical
implications of such an outcome, verifying if it can be replicated
in an environment with rational agents and what this tells us in
terms of the importance of the role transparency plays in public
procurement. The results are reassuring in that we find that the
stylized fact mentioned above may have nothing to do with
transparency playing a role in enhancing corruption opportunities.
However, they also remind us that each country has its own
culture and institutions and that transparency might not be
enough to eradicate corruption at a cost which is compatible with
society’s agreement to eradicate it.
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2 The index defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain,
and measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among a
country’s public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, drawing on 16
surveys from 10 independent institutions, which gathered the opinions of
businesspeople and country analysts. Only 159 of the world’s countries are
included in the survey, due to an absence of reliable data from the remaining
countries. The scores range from ten (squeaky clean) to zero (highly corrupt). A
score of 5.0 is the number Transparency International considers the borderline
figure distinguishing countries that do and do not have a serious corruption
problem. More than two-thirds of the 159 nations surveyed scored less than five
out of a top score of 10 on the index, which reflects perceptions of business
people, academics, and other political observers, both within and outside each
country. More than half scored less than three, indicating the perception of a
severe corruption problem. The index, first launched in 1995, draws on 16 surveys
from 10 independent institutions, including The Economist Intelligence Unit,
World Markets Research Centre, and Freedom House. As survey of surveys this
index has the advantage that if the errors in the measurements are independent
and are identically distributed, then the average used they give TI can reduce the
error.
2. - The Model
Consider an economy composed of three types of players: a
principal (the State), a population of agents (bureaucrats), and a
population of identical firms. Economic agents are risk neutral.
The State delegates the good’s “y” purchase to a bureaucrat. There
is a continuum of bureaucrats and firms, and their number is
normalized to 1 for both categories. Bureaucrats earn a fixed
salary “w”, while firms sell to the State the good “y”. We assume
that the good’s price is given, and let firms compete in quality:
the higher the quality offered, the lower the profit for firms and
the higher the welfare for the community. The bureaucrats
organize an auction for the procurement of a certain good. It is
further assumed that an information asymmetry exists, in that the
State is unaware of the good’s quality. In fact, the quality of the
good is observable only after controls by an independent monitor.
The State, in order to weed out or reduce corruption 1) ex-ante
fixes the level of Transparency, “T”, of the tender and 2) ex-post
monitors firms’ and bureaucrats’ behavior uncorruptable third
parties. It is common knowledge that the bureaucrat is
corruptible, in the sense that he pursues his own interest, and not
necessarily that of the State; in particular, the bureaucrat is open
to bribery. In fact only the bureaucrat observes firms’ bids’ which
are submitted in closed envelopes. As a general rule, the firm that
offers the highest quality wins the auction. The bureaucrat can,
when proclaiming the winner, lie on the bids’s true quality in
exchange for a bribe “b”. Let bd be the bribe demanded by the
bureaucrat. Then, the firm has two options: 1) refuse payment of
the bribe, or 2) accept to pay and start negotiating the bribe with
the bureaucrat. For simplicity, we assume that the level of quality
can take only two values: a high quality level, the highest level of
quality — that correspond to the lowest profit level πl — and a
low quality level, the lowest level of quality — that correspond to
the highest profit level πh. 
The State fixes the level of transparency “T”. We assume that
a higher transparency reduces the ability of the bureaucrat to be
able to lie on the quality of the offered good. This implies that,
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there is an inverted relationship between the possibility for the
bureaucrat to make a bid of low quality a winning bid and the level
of transparency “T”. In fact we assume that the bureaucrat supports
a cost proportional to the transparency level “T”, in order to lie
about the quality of good. In our model a higher transparency level
will imply the reduction of the surplus that the bureaucrat and the
firm can themselves share. The surplus reduction is such that
beyond a certain threshold it eliminates the economic convenience
of corruption. Furthermore, the State checks on the behavior of
firms and bureaucrats. There is an exogenous probability “q” of
being detected, given that corruption has taken place. q ∈[0, 1] can
therefore be thought of as the ex-post monitoring level implemented
by the State. The bureaucrat in country “i” caught in a corrupt
transaction, incurs a cost — for the social stigma associated with
being found guilty — equal to “ci” where ci ∈[0, 1]. In our model
every country is characterized by its own different “inner honesty”,
whether due to historical developments, political regime, economic
cycle or else. Each country therefore has a different level of costs
it associates with finding corrupted actions. In the first part, for
simplicity, we assume that bureaucrats all have the same moral cost.
In the second part we let bureaucrats differ in this respect, by
assuming that bureaucrats of a single country have different moral
costs. The firm, if detected, must supply the high quality product
— with πl profit — but is refunded the cost of the bribe, paid to
the bureaucrat.3
2.1 The Game: Description and Solution
Given the model just described, the economic problem can be
formalized by the following three-period dynamic game with
perfect and complete information (see Graph 2).
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3 This assumption can be more easily understood when, rather than corruption,
there is extortion by the bureaucrat, even though, in many countries, the relevant
provisions or laws, stipulate that the bribe shall in any case, be returned to the
entrepreneur, and that combined minor punishment, (penal and/or pecuniary), be
inflicted on him/her.
(1) In the first stage of the game, the State fixes the level of
transparency “T”, by minimizing its own loss-function.
(2) In stage two, the bureaucrat, facing a series of
entrepreneurs that want to sell the product “y” to the Public
Administration, may: a) decide not to ask for a bribe (bd = 0) in
which case all entrepreneurs will offer the high quality product
and one entrepreneur selected by random draw will win the
auction — with a πl profit assumed > 0 — or, b) he may negotiate
the payment of a bribe (bd > 0) with one entrepreneur.
(2.1) If bd = 0 no bribe is asked for, and the payoff vector for
the entrepreneurs and bureaucrats is:
(1) –π1 =(πl ,w) 
The game ends in the equilibrium NC (No Corruption).
(2.2) Otherwise, let bd = 0 be the positive bribe asked for by
the bureaucrat. In this case the game continues to stage three.
(3) At stage three the firm decides whether to negotiate the
bribe or turn it down.
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GRAPH 2
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(3.1) If the firm refuses the bribe, then the entrepreneur must
supply the high quality product and the payoff vector is given by:
(2) π2—
=(πl ,w) 
Then, in this case the game ends. There is no penalty for the
bureaucrat.
(3.2) Otherwise negotiation occur, and the two parties will find
the bribe corresponding to the Nash solution to a bargaining game
(bNB) and the game ends. The bureaucrat supports a cost “T”,
proportional to the level of transparency of the tender, in order to
lie about the quality of good. This bribe is the outcome of a
negotiation between the bureaucrat and the firm, who will be
assumed to share in a given surplus. The payoffs will depend on
whether the bureaucrat and the firm are detected, (with
probability “q”) or not detected, (with probability (1–q)). There is
a moral cost (ci) for the detected bureaucrat. The firm, if detected,
must sell a high quality product, but is refunded the cost of the
bribe, paid to the bureaucrat. If the firm decides to pay the bribe,
the expected payoff vector is given by:
(3) π3—
= ((1–q)πh + qπl –(1–q)b, w + (1–q)b–qci–T)
The game ends in the equilibrium C (Corruption).
In what follows, we refer to the firm payoff by a superscript
(1), to the bureaucrat payoff by a superscript (2): they represent
respectively the first and the second element of the payoff vector
πi—
, i = 1, 2, 3.
We first determine the equilibrium bribe (bNB) (see Appendix
A for the proof).
Proposition 2.1. Let q ≠ 14. Then there exists a unique non
negative bribe (bNB), as the Nash solution to a bargaining game,
given by:
(4)
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4 If q = 1 this stage of the game is never reached.
where:
is the share of the surplus that goes to the bureaucrat and η and
λ are the parameters that can be interpreted as the bargaining
strength measures of the firm and the bureaucrat respectively and
where ∆π=πh–πl.
As a consequence of the model, let us assume that the
bureaucrat and the firm share the surplus on an equal basis. This
is the standard Nash case, when η = λ = 1 and the bureaucrat
and the firm get equal shares. In this case the bribe is:
(5)
In other words, the bribe represents 50 percent of surplus. 
The payoff vector is given by:
(6)
Comparative Statics
(1) By analyzing this derivative we observe that:
(7)
Therefore, increasing the transparency’s level increases the
bribe’s level;
(2) And by analyzing:
(8)
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Therefore increasing monitoring increases the equilibrium
bribe, because the greater bribe serves to compensate the greater
risk of being discovered. 
By solving the static game, we can prove the following
proposition:5
Proposition 2.2. Let
(a) if ci ∈ [0, c*i) the payoff vector is
(9)
(b) if ci ∈ [c*i, 1] the payoff vector is
(10) π1—
= (πl, w)
Then, once a transparency level equal to T is set:
(a) if ci ∈ [0, c*i), all the bureaucrats will be corrupt at that
level of transparency T. If this condition (equilibrium C) applies,
the firm finds it convenient to pay a bribe. The surplus is such
as to make up for the expected cost of corruption. Thus the surplus
to be shared between the firm and the bureaucrat will keep a
negotiation going, whose outcome is the bribe corresponding to
the Nash solution to a bargaining game. In this equilibrium all
bureaucrats will be corrupt at that level of chosen transparency. 
(b) if ci ∈ [c*i, 1], all the bureaucrats will be honest at that
level of transparency T. If this condition (equilibrium NC) applies
the difference in profits is not enough to make up for the expected
cost of corruption. With this in mind, the bureaucrat will not ask
the entrepreneur for a bribe and then all the bureaucrats will be
honest and quality will be of a high level.
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5 See Appendix B for the proof.
It follows that, once a transparency level equal to “T” is set,
if the moral cost of the i-th country ci is lower than
then all the bureaucrats will be corrupt at that level of chosen
transparency.
If the moral cost ci is greater or equal than c*i then all the
bureaucrats will be honest. Therefore, because all bureaucrats
incur the same moral costs, this leads to a corner-solution: either
all bureaucrats will be corrupt or they will be honest, depending
on the moral cost of a specific country.
One implication of this very simple model is that, for a given
level of predisposition to corruption in country, if the State wants
to eradicate corruption it will have to fix a level of transparency
so that: ci = c*i. Then,
(11) T*i = (1–q)∆π – qci
is the minimum transparency level that country “i” – given its
predisposition to corruption ci – will have to put in place to
eliminate corruption in procurement. Notice that with great moral
costs (a country “innerly honest”) the needed level of transparency
in procurement is low and viceversa.
2.2 Transparency with Heterogeneous Moral Costs
In the previous section we have shown that if all bureaucrats
incur the same moral costs, this leads to a corner-solution: in fact,
once a transparency level equal to T is set, if the moral cost is
lower than c*i, then all the bureaucrats will be corrupt at that level
of transparency; if moral cost ci is greater or equal than c*i then
all the bureaucrats will be honest. The corruption level depends
on the hypothesis made on the distribution of costs.
That moral costs are equal across bureaucrats is a convenient
assumption, but not necessarily a realistic one. For this reason we
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introduce the hypothesis that these costs may vary across the
various bureaucrats (ci,j the i-th country j-th bureaucrat), reflecting
different ethical, moral and religious individual values or denoting
a greater or lesser sense of their own impunity.
The cumulative density of probability, defines the distribution
of individual costs for the i-th country F(ci,j), where “i” is the
country and “j” the specific bureaucrat of country “i”. This
function represents the proportion of bureaucrats who agree to
be corrupted when the transparency level is “T”. If, as we will
assume, the distribution of bureaucrats’ costs is uniform in the
interval [ci,min, ci,max], (in a different interval for each country),
then the cumulative density function will be:
(12)
We now solve the model by identifying the optimal level of
transparency for country “i”. We then focus on a heuristic cross-
country analysis. F(ci,j) represents the number of bureaucrats in
country “i” that will be corrupt, given a certain level of
transparency “T”. Since
substituting in (12) we obtain:
(13)
Comparative Statics
(1) By analyzing this derivative we observe that:
(14)
 
∂
∂
πF c
q
T
c c q
i j
i i
,
,max ,min
( )
= −
−
−( ) <
∆
2
0
 
F c
q
q
T
q
c
c ci j
i
i i
,
,min
,max ,min_
( ) =
−( )
− −
∆π 1
c
q
q
T
qi
*
=
−( )
−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
∆π 1
 
F c
c c
dc
c c
c ci j i ic
c
j
j i
i i
i
j
,
,max ,min
,min
,max ,min
,min
–
( ) =
−
=
−∫ 1
RIVISTA DI POLITICA ECONOMICA JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2006
196
Therefore increasing monitoring reduces the equilibrium level
of corruption, because this reduces the potential surplus that the
bureaucrat and firm can share, and thus reduce the corruption
level. In particular we can demonstrate that the monitoring level
that eliminates corruption is:
(15)
Then to eradicate corruption a level of monitoring lower than
1 is necessary;
(2) And by analyzing:
(16)
Therefore, increasing the transparency’ level also reduces the
corruption level. If State “i” wanted to eradicate corruption it
should fix a level of transparency Ti such that:
(17)
i.e. when:
(18) Ti
* = ∆π(1 − q) – qci, min
This level of transparency is necessary to eliminate corruption
in country “i”. However the State, in fixing transparency “T”,
beside its benefits must also take into account of the costs deriving
from reaching a certain degree of transparency. Let us assume for
simplicity that each State will have similar marginal benefit and
marginal cost functions from increasing transparency. The
marginal benefit is due to the advantage of obtaining a high
quality product instead of a low quality product.
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Let us assume the marginal benefit BMA(T) to be constant as
the value of procurement increases and equal across countries:
BMA = a. Instead we assume that the marginal cost of
transparency increases with transparency. With this assumption
we want to capture the standard and partly exogenous structure
of public procurement, characterized by some tenders with large
values making up large shares of total procurement and a large
amount of small tenders with small values: as the value of
transparent procurement rises by one unit of value we reach
smaller and smaller tenders and as the cost of tenders has a fixed
component (e.g. tender committees and publication costs) the
marginal cost per unit of value of procurement progressively
increases. The loss function of the State in the first stage of the
game will be given by: 
(19) L = – aT+bT2
Minimizing with respect to “T” we obtain:
(20) ∂L = 0 ⇒ T° = a
∂T 2b
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GRAPH 3
OPTIMAL TRANSPARENCY LEVEL
This figure shows the optimal transparency level. The horizontal line is the
marginal cost BMA=a, while the positively sloped line is the marginal cost equal
to 2bT.
So each country “i” there will be two relevant values of
transparency:
• Ti
* = (1 – q)∆π – qci,min
is the specific level of minimum transparency needed to
eliminate corruption due to the distribution of bureaucrats’ costs
uniform in the interval;
• T° = 
a
T
2b
is the optimal level of transparency, assumed equal across
countries.
3. - Analysis Cross-Country
In a heuristic fashion, let us consider the implications of this
set-up for two countries: country “i”, with a low “inner honesty”,
i.e. with, a distribution of bureaucrats’ costs uniform in the
interval [ci,min, ci,max] and country “k” with higher “inner honesty”,
i.e. a distribution of bureaucrats’ costs uniform in the interval
[ck,min, ck,max] such that ci,min < ck,min and ci,max, < ck,max. Assume also
that the distributions of moral costs are such that:
• Ti
* = (1 – q)∆π – qci,min > T° = 
a
2b
• Tk
* = (1 – q)∆π – qck,min < T° = 
a
2b
What will emerge is that country “k” with high “inner honesty”
will choose a level of transparency of total procurement Tk
*, that
will allow the eradication of corruption in procurement. Country
“i” will instead not find it convenient to eradicate all corruption
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— since Ti
* > T° — and fixing the share of transparent public
procurement at T = T° would imply not maximizing total welfare
given the costs of transparency. This implies that for country “i”
the optimal level of transparency will be T°, even if such a level
will note eradicate corruption. A share of bureaucrats, those with
a level of moral costs lower than,
will continue to be corrupt.
This simple example shows that in equilibrium what emerges
is that a country with greater honesty will fix a level of transparency
in its procurement lower than a country that will appear more
corrupt, confirming the only apparent paradox shown by the data
that less corrupt countries choose to make transparent a lower share
of their total procurement through open procedures.
4. - Conclusions
The European Union calls transparency a principle of
procurement. It must be a principle to be pursued with pragmatism
however, as the same EU Directives allow for different degrees of
transparency depending on the size of the tender, recognizing
implicitly that transparency has a cost for society. If transparency
is costly, then we have shown that countries where corruption is
more pervasive and less easy to eradicate will stop short of
implementing the level of transparency in procurement that would
dissolve corruption. It will however find it beneficial to implement
larger transparency in procurement compared to countries with a
better track-record for corruption intolerance. If we agree that
corruption in procurement plays a large role in influencing total
corruption in a country, this leaves one with a final question: how
to eradicate corruption if transparency is costly? It is not an easy
answer that we might want to leave open. We suggest however,
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following the approach taken by other scholars, that other types of
transparency might be imagined. Picci (2005) suggests using IT
technologies to publish on user-friendly platforms the results of
similar tenders across the country so as to allow public procurement
stake-holders (including citizens) to monitor contract characteristics
across administrations. This best-practice, benchmarking approach
may create a strong constituency in the country, able to further
raise the cost of corrupt behaviour and thereby reduce corruption.
“Voice” and “Public Governance” will thus acquire new power
thanks to the quality of specifically tailored e-based solutions.
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A APPENDIX
The Nash Bargaining Bribe
Let π∆—
= π4—
– π3—
= π(1)∆, π
(2)
∆ be the vector of the differences in
the payoffs between the case of agreement and disagreement about
the bribe, between bureaucrat and entrepreneur. In accordance
with generalized Nash bargaining theory, the division between two
agents will solve:
(21)
b
max
∈ℜ+
[π(1)∆ η] [π(2)∆ λ]
in formula
(22)
b
max
∈ℜ+
[∆π(1 – q) – (1 – q)b]η [(1 – q)b – qci – T]λ
that is the maximum of the product between the elements of  π∆—
and where [0, w] is the point of disagreement, i.e. the payoffs that
the entrepreneur and the bureaucrat respectively would obtain if
they did not come to an agreement. The parameters η and λ can
be interpreted as measures of bargaining strength. It is now easy
to check that the bureaucrat gets a share 
µ ≡ λλ+η
of the surplus , i.e. the bribe is b=µτ. More generally µ reflects
the distribution of bargaining strength between two agents. Then
the bribe bNB is an asymmetric (or generalized) Nash bargaining
solution and is given by:
(23)
that is the unique equilibrium bribe in the last subgame ∀q ≠ 1.
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B APPENDIX
Solution to the Static Game
Backward induction method. The static game is solved with
the backward induction method, which allows identification at the
equilibria. Starting from stage 3, the entrepreneur needs to decide
whether to negotiate with the bureaucrat. Both payoffs are then
compared, because the bureaucrat asked for a bribe.
(3) At stage three the entrepreneur negotiates the bribe if, and
only if 
π(1)3 ≥ π(1)2 ⇒
(24)
(2) Going up the decision-making tree, at stage two the
bureaucrat decides whether to ask for a positive bribe.
Let
then the bureaucrat knows that if he asks for a positive bribe, the
entrepreneur will accept the negotiation, and the final bribe will be
bNB. Then at stage two, the bureaucrat asks for a bribe if, and only if
π(2)3 ≥ π(2)1 ⇒
(25)
that is the bureaucrat’s payoff. If
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holds, then (18) is always verified. Then, in this case if c ≤ c*, then
bureaucrat ask for the bribe bNB, that the entrepreneur will accept.
The expected payoff vector is given by:
(26)
The game ends in the equilibrium C (Corruption).
Let 
then the bureaucrat knows that the entrepreneurs will not
accept any possible bribe, so he will be honest and the firm must
sell the product at high level quality. The payoff vector for the
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats is:
(27) π1—
=(πl, w)
The game ends in the equilibrium NC (No Corruption).
(1) At stage one the State fixes the transparency’ level T, by
minimizing own loss-function.
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